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ABSTRACT: 
Following the successful experience of some developed counties in 
Power market restructuring and reforms, many developing countries 
have followed suit. Iran has for the last thirty years, since its Islamic 
revolution of 1979, had an economy dominated by the state, but has 
been pushed to take some legal steps towards private participation in 
the electricity sector so as to meet the rapidly rising electricity 
demand.   This paper aims to appraise the successfulness of Power 
market restructuring and privatization of electricity industry in Iran. A 
few years from the commencement of the reforms, the program can be 
assessed as realistically successful. However, there are plentiful 
challenges which need to be addressed through legislation. In this 
study, challenges to competition and Pitfalls of the reforms in the 
Iranian restructured electricity market will be reviewed. as well as 
this, a number of  recommendations will be offered. 
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ABREVIATIONS 
 
BOO -----------------------------------------------------Build, Operate, Own 
BOT-----------------------------------------------------Build, Operate, Transfer 
IGMC-------------------------------------   Iran Grid Management Company 
IRIC----------------------------------Islamic Republic Of Iran Constitution 
IRPP----------------------------------------------------------------Iran Power Pool 
IPP------------------------------------------------Independent Power Producer 
PPA--------------------------------------------------Power Purchase Agreement 
PSO----------------------------------------------------Public Service Obligations 
TAVANIR( Farsi Acronym)----------- Power Production, Transmission 
and Supply Company Of Iran 
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Introduction 
 
Iran, located in the middle-east where power market restructuring is a relatively 
new concept, having had most of its big industries in state hands since its 1979 
Islamic revolution, has had market reforms high on its agenda for more than 18 
years now. However, the primary round of reforms did not pursue competition 
and privatization, due to a constitutional ban on private ownership of mother 
industries, but sought a more able mechanism for capacity expansion through 
government investment. A slight modification of the relevant constitutional 
provisions2 enabled the government to initiate plans like those of developed 
countries almost ten years ago.It was then that market reforms commenced and 
a gradual ownership reforms, Privatization, became a priority. What makes Iran 
different, however, from many other countries is that Iran is privatizing not 
only its electricity industry but also most of its other major industries and state 
financial institutions at about the same time. It is in this background, that Iran is 
taking this giant ambitious and potentially hazardous leap. Additionally, 
upstream oil and gas generation can not be privatized according to the Iranian 
Constitution which vests the ownership of and the right to extract and market 
all mineral resources in the government. Given that most electricity is produced 
from either oil or gas in Iran, this virtually means there is little money to save 
since all generators will have to buy their primary energy from the government 
                                                 
2 General Policies of Article 44 of the Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, Exigency Council May 
22, 2005 
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at the same price; In fact, the government guarantees provision of fuel to 
generators. However, generation privatization is still desirable since it can 
obviously lead to a boost in efficiency lowering the costs of production. 
 
The government is faced with a rising demand curve (see graph 1) obliging it to 
make fresh investments, yet akin to many other developing countries, 
government money is tight and private investors have to come to the 
government’s rescue.  
 
There are substantial subsidies on electricity which at least in the short run are 
extremely difficult to remove3. Considering this, not much of the financial 
burden will fall off the government’s shoulders once privatization is done since 
it will still have to spend large sums of money on subsidies and give 
burdensome guarantees to generators in order to encourage investment. 
However, the desire of the government to raise immediate revenues through 
selling the assets in the sector should not be overlooked4. In addition to this, the 
government appears neither very willing5  nor able to attract a great deal of 
foreign investment  while, at best, few domestic companies or individuals can 
                                                 
3 Iran Ministry of Power, “Goals of Privatization” [ in Farsi] 
<http://www.moe.org.ir/DesktopModules/Articles/ArticlesView.aspx?TabID=0&Site=DouranPortal&
Lang=fa-IR&ItemID=942&mid=20014> (April 25, 2020) 
4 . R., Bacon and J. Besant-Jones, “Global electric Power Reform, Privatization and Liberalization of 
The Electric Power Industry in Developing Countries”, available in Energy and Mining Sector Board 
Discussion Paper Series, Paper No 2, June 2002 p. 1. 
5 However, the power ministry does have the legal consent to enter contracts with prospective foreign 
investors for generation based on article 122 of the Third Five year economic, cultural and social 
development plan Act (Wednesday, April 5, 2000).   
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qualify as investors capable of contributing to the electricity sector given the 
capital intensive nature of the industry.  
 
In this study, initially, a short review of literature on restructuring and 
competition will be provided. Second, a clear picture of the electricity market 
in the country will be painted elaborating on attempts thus far made along with 
providing a brief history of its power industry. Relevant regulatory and 
monitoring organs will be expounded and reference will be made to how the 
system functions. An assessment of the extent of the effectiveness of the plan 
in creating workable competition will be provided along with recommendations 
as to how the efficacy can be enhanced. Considering the scope of this study, 
much detail of the system was thought of as superfluous and, in turn, not 
included. It should be acknowledged that government reports and statistical 
data relevant to the Iranian electricity sector are not very easily accessible 
specially after the year 2006 and, therefore, there might exist minor 
inaccuracies in the figures provided. 
 
Literature (Market Reforms/Competition/prices) 
  
As far as electricity privatization and market reform are concerned, a vast body 
of literature has thus far built up around the experiences of developed countries 
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as instructive examples that can be followed by developing countries6.The 
experience of developed countries have been assessed as generally successful7. 
Electric power prices are usually used as a benchmark against which the 
successfulness of a structural reform in the electricity sectors is gauged. 
However, experiences in most countries show privatization and market reform, 
however effective in dragging wholesale8 and industrial electricity prices down, 
do not often result in any significant reduction of prices for residential 
electricity, with UK being one of the only exceptions.9 
   
 As to developing countries, Nagayama (2007) suggests that neither unbundling 
nor introduction of a wholesale pool market alone necessarily reduces the 
electric power price. Contrary to expectations, there is a tendency for the price 
to rise10. It is usually only when competition exists that market reforms and 
privatization become truly effective at least as far as prices are concerned.11In 
                                                 
6 . See for example  J. Surrey(ed), The British electricity experiment; the record, the issue and the 
lessons, Earthscan publication limited, 1997 
7 D. Newbery., “Privatisation, restructuring, and regulation of network utilities” ,The MIT Press, 
Cambridge MA & London, England, 1999, 466pp 
8 P. Joskow, “Electricity Sector Restructuring and Competition: Lessons Learned”,40(121) Cuadernos 
de Economía, Año 548(december 2003) 
 
9 A., Fateh, “Privatization in Iranian Electricity Industry”( 2003) (In Farsi)  
<http://mepc.moe.org.ir/_ippi/Documents/%D8%AE%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B5%D9%8A%20%D8
%B3%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%8A%20%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%AA%20%D8%A8%D8%
B1%D9%82%20%D8%AF%D8%B1%20%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86_2009012
5_150820.pdf>   (January 15, 2010). 
10H. Nagayama, “Effects of regulatory reforms in the electricity supply industry on electricity prices in 
developing countries”,35(6) Energy policy3440(2007). 
 
11Y., Zhang, C., Kirkpatrick, D.,  Parker, “Electricity sector reform in developing countries: an 
econometric assessment of the effects of privatization, competition and regulation, centre on regulation 
and competition”. Working Paper Series, no. 31, October(2002). 
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fact, most developing countries reform their market structure to encourage 
private participation, enhance performance and most importantly create further 
generation capacity without necessarily meaning to create competition. 
However, Yin-Fang Zhang, David Parker, Colin Kirkpatrick (2007) 
demonstrate that in developing countries privatization and regulation do not 
necessarily result in any enhancement of performance without competition12. 
Thus, privatization is not usually considered as a desirable goal in itself unless 
it leads to competition. There is not a single prescription for market reforms, 
but the importance of competition has been frequently stressed (Bortolotti and 
Perotti 200713, Newberry 200414). 
 
It should be born in mind that by competition in energy sectors, more often 
than not, perfect competition is not meant since even in the most competitive 
markets, such as the UK, market segmentations made in favour of strategically 
preferable fuels serving government strategies go against free market and 
competition. Dagdeviren(2009) shows that even in developed markets ‘ 
competition remains highly imperfect even in market segments where it has 
been considered feasible’15.  
 
                                                 
12  Zhang, Y.,  Parker, D.,  Kirkpatrick, C.,  “Competition, regulation and privatisation of electricity 
generation in developing countries: does the sequencing of the reforms matter?” 33 J Regul Econ 159 
(2008). 
 
13     B. , Bortolotti, E.,  Perotti, “From government to regulatory governance: 
Privatisation and the residual role of the state” 22(1) The World Bank Research Observer 53 (2007) . 
14 Newbery, D M.,  “Regulation and competition policy: longer-term boundaries”  
Utilities Polic 12 (2004): 93. 
15 H., Dagdeviren, 2009. “Limits to Competition And Regulation In Privatized Electricity Markets,” 80 
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 4 (2009): 641. 
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Hass and Auer (2006) suggests that liberalization, privatization and 
deregulation do not on their own create workable competition and enumerates 
the following six prerequisites for competition. 
 
‘A. Separation of the grid from generation and supply 
B. Wholesale price deregulation 
C. Sufficient transmission capacity 
D. Excess generation capacity 
E. Short-term spot markets and financial instruments 
F. No excessive post-reform government intervention’16 
 
Iran Electricity Industry 
Facts and figures 
As of the year 2000, before Iran started its market reforms, Iran had the biggest 
electricity Network in the region and the 19th biggest in the world17. In 2005, it 
was the 17th according to the IEA reports.18 
Electricity sector was the biggest public utility sector in the country with more 
than 17 million subscribers. Fixed assets of the industry was estimated to be 
approximately 150 thousand billion Rials19. The industry faced critical 
                                                 
16 R. Haas and H. Auer, “The prerequisites for effective competition in restructured wholesale 
electricity markets”, 31 (6–7) Energy857 (2006). 
17. A report on current conditions of Iran Power Industry; Recommended Policies to Tavanir Co.( In Farsi)  at : 
http://regulatory.moe.org.ir/_DouranPortal/Documents/pres002.ppt ( Last visited on 16/01/2010) 
18 Kaveh Aflaki Khorashani, Shahram Jadid, Mohammad Shahidpour “Electric Power Restructuring in 
Iran : Achievements and Challenge”s, 2009 
19 An equivalent of approximately 15.7 Billion dollars.  
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financial restrictions and had a debt of at least 20000 billion Rials20 to a 
number of leading Iranian Banks21. 
 
According to IEA reports in 2006(Annex1), 73.5 per cent of the total 
production, is produced from gas. Oil accounts for as much as about 17.5 
percent of total production and the rest, about 9 percent, is produced from 
Hydro-generators, the only viable renewable energy source in Iran. The country 
has slightly more exports than imports. Nearly 35 percent is used for industrial 
purposes , 32 percent for residential purposes and 18 percent for commercial 
and public sectors and the rest for agriculture and others. regarding 
consumption, a comparison of these figures with those of a developed country 
like UK reveals only insignificant differences in proportions .However, as to 
production there is obviously more diversity of supply in UK with nuclear, 
wind, coal, biomass and waste being other sources of production( IEA reports 
2006). The differences in production patterns can easily be justified by taking 
strategic reasons into consideration. Iran, holding the second largest gas and oil 
reserves in the world, sees little sense in the rationale behind diversification 
which usually comes at an extra cost; nevertheless the market reforms do 
pursue diversity of production as a goal. Also, as it is often the case, 
developing countries are less concerned with environmental issues and 
obviously less financially capable of sparing money on promoting more 
environmentally friendly modes of electricity production. Given these figures 
                                                 
20 An equivalent of approximately 2.10 Billion Dollars. 
21 Fateh. Supra note 11 at 7.  
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the country is not particularly capacity short, but does inevitably seem to have 
to create additional generation capacity for at least two reasons. First, like most 
developing countries, given the country’s rising population along with the need 
to electrify remote villages and newly built areas of rapidly expanding cities, 
generation capacity should be increased at a rapid pace. In fact, electricity 
demand has increased seven times from 1979 to 1999 and was estimated to 
double between 2000 and 201022. Second, as a developing country undergoing 
massive industrialization, Iran is likely to face a larger electricity demand for 
industries in the not too distant future. 
Graph 1: Electricity demand curve from 1965 to 2000 
Source: Iran Power Ministry Website 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Supra note 19 at 8. 
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History: A history of the Iranian electricity industry  
 
Iranian Power Industry started as a private service. In fact, the first private 
electricity company in Iran was granted a license for establishing commercial 
electric lighting in  1906 with a capacity of 400 KW adequate merely to keep 
four thousand lights on. From 1906 until 1937 the light office of the city hall in 
the Capital was responsible for supervising private electricity supply facilities 
23used mainly for street illuminations, more of a public utility, which was 
replaced by Tehran electricity institute In 193724. After 1940, government 
involvement increased in electrification. In the years which followed, 
electricity demand rose significantly necessitating an independent institution 
for electricity which was formed in 1963. Two years later, electricity and water 
Ministry was established nationalizing electricity in 1967 due to the fact that 
private companies could not afford to pay for their running expenses and the 
government was considered more capable of managing it efficiently25; an 
administrative feature of this period is that electricity prices began to be highly 
subsidized26. In 1968 TAVANIR (Management of Generation, Supply and 
Transmission Co plc) was established as a vertically integrated state Power 
Company holding a monopoly right working under the auspices of the Power 
Ministry which has managed water and electricity of the country for many 
years. TAVANIR Company had Public service Obligations (PSO) and the 
                                                 
23 Kaveh Aflaki Khorashani, Shahram Jadid, Mohammad Shahidpour “Electric Power Restructuring in 
Iran : Achievements and Challenges,” 2009 
24   Supra note 19 at 9. 
25  Ibid. 
26  25 
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prices were set based on expenses of production. The same system remained in 
operation until market reforms, the focus of this study, in 2002 kicked off. 
 
Market Reforms: 
  
When electricity market reforms started in Iran, privatization of electricity 
sector was technically not advisable and legally impossible as a result of a 
constitutional prohibition.  Prior to privatization, reforms had to be carried out 
in the electricity market structure of the country to enable competition giving 
the country ample opportunity to ensure a smooth transition to a private 
market. Three major reasons are often cited for market reforms in Iran A: 
creating competition in power generation and supply. B: attracting financial 
resources through the participation of non-government companies in 
investment. C: Improving economic efficiency27. Official steps for 
restructuring were taken only as late as the early months of 2001 due to the 
need for investment in capacity expansion because of the insurmountable 
demand rises. The first step was unbundling the electricity sector into 
Generation, Transmission, distribution and supply. Based on the initial plans, 
Creation of a competitive atmosphere through corporatization of the regional 
                                                 
27  M. Ghazi Zade Jamal Ariyayi, H. Javidi, “Iranian  Power Market: History, Reasons and Particulars” 
( In Farsi): 
<http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:2f7vMXtqokJ:regulatory.moe.org.ir/_DouranPortal/Documents
/Iran_Power_Market.ppt+iran_power_market+filetype:ppt&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=firef
ox-a> (January 25, 2010) 
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electricity companies was given premium over privatization28, until 
privatization of electricity could be made legally feasible. In fact, ownership 
reforms were procrastinated until after structural reforms and creation of a 
market. It has been proved that ‘introducing competition before privatisation is 
correlated with higher electricity generation, higher generation capacity and, in 
the case of the sequence of competition before privatisation, improved capital 
utilisation’29. Besides, creation of competition and privatization do not 
necessarily have to happen together. As graph 2 indicates, In many countries 
one has been done without much of the other. 
 
 
Graph 2  
Private
Ownership
Public
Competition Market Structure Monopoly
Denmark
Netherlands
Germany
Canada Norway
NZ
England and Wales
Italy
Sweden
Spain
USA
Japan
2000    1987
 
                                                 
28 Ibid. 
29 Supra note 14 at 8. 
 
Source: World Bank 
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Only generation and supply were selected to be made competitive while 
transmission and distribution, being natural monopolies, remained in public 
ownership30 functioning as regulated monopolies. A new state-owned company 
was founded called the IGMC. Besides, Regional electricity companies 
remained responsible for both generation and supply. 
Power Grid: 
Tavanir Co., previously holding a vertical monopoly in all electricity sectors, 
based on its constitution had the duty of promoting competition and creating 
and operating a market.31 In fulfilment of this duty the Budget ACT OF 2004 
gave it the permission to buy all the shares of one of its subsidiaries from its 
budgetary resources and confer the management of Grid and creation of a 
market to it32. The Constitution of the new company had to be proposed by the 
Power Ministry. IGMC, Iran Grid Management Company, was established as a 
state company responsible for operating the Grid and the market.  
Based on its Constitution, some of its most important goals are  
A. Running and Control of the grid ensuring security of grid and security of 
supply. B. Offering access to grid to all applicants regardless of their 
                                                 
30  Chapter 2, Article 2 Act of amendment of some provisions of the Fourth Economic, 
cultural and social  Development Plan and application of The General Policies of 
Article 44 of The Constitution, June 14, 2008, Iran Islamic Parliament  
.  
 
31 2003/2004 Budget Act March 14, 2004, Iran Islamic Parliament.  
 
32Tavanir Company Articles of Association, Power ministry (January 18, 2003 )   at: 
<http://www.tavanir.org.ir/farsi/nashrieh/mali/82/3509.pdf> ( January 25, 2010). 
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ownership. C. Creating conditions for competitive electricity sales through 
operating a market and creating and electricity Stock market which has not yet 
been created. D. Taking all necessary measures to ensure Power supply and 
promote private participation and competition in Electricity production and 
supply within the set frameworks of the Power Ministry33.      
 
Wholesale Market:  
IGMC was also responsible for creating and running the wholesale market. 
Ministerial Directives dictated a Power Pool. IRPP, Iran Power Pool, operates 
on a daily basis taking the lowest bids based on the assumptions received from 
buyers. On the one side, power sellers include Regional electricity companies 
and Private generators, which are parties to a contract with the power Ministry. 
On the other side of the pool, Regional electricity companies, having been 
corprotized , are the only buyers. There have been attempts to include big 
industries on the Buyers side, as well. However, because of regulatory 
deficiencies, as of now, they cannot participate in the pool in a transparent 
atmosphere yet. The Operator announces estimations of the required amount, 
based on offers received from buyers, and electricity sellers bid for every 24 
hours on a confidential basis. A dispatching centre, State owned and also 
controlled by the IGMC34, is responsible for running the technical facets of the 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 IGMC Articles of association , Power Ministry ,  
<http://sabainfo.ir/content/media/law/633201092825025000.pdf > (25 January, 2010) 
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market and remains in touch with electricity sellers and buyers all through. 
Winners are announced to the dispatching centre which interacts with the 
market for any necessary modifications in the amounts; electricity is bought 
from generators at a uniform price called the Pool Price. The final outcomes are 
announced at 4 pm one day earlier.  
 
Regulator: 
 
 A regulatory committee consisting of five members was created in 2003 based 
on a Ministerial directive. The members are appointed directly by the Minister 
of Power who also selects the head of the committee. Members, who appoint a 
secretary, count as employees of the ministry. They are responsible for 
supervising over the pool and providing regulation required for running the 
pool in any unforeseen circumstances; Regulation generally lies with the Power 
Ministry itself. 
 
The Concept of regulator’s independence in decision making depends, more 
than anything, on three issues. First: legal protection i.e. commissioners may 
not be dismissed without due cause. Second: institutional and managerial 
independence: i.e. being based outside the Ministry and having complete 
control over the appointment and management of their staff and third: financial 
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independence35. The commission obviously does not meet any of  these 
standards and, therefore, does not qualify as an independent regulator. 
Privatization of electricity in Iran 
The economy of Iran is and has been heavily dominated by the state in the last 
30 years after the 1979 revolution. According to article 44 of The Iranian 
Constitution, the economy consists of three sectors i.e., the state, the 
cooperative and the private. Based on the second paragraph of the mentioned 
article ‘The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother industries, 
foreign trade, major minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams, and 
large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and 
telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these 
will be publicly owned and administered by the State.’36 This article leaves 
virtually all major parts of the economy in state hands. The private sector is in 
fact restricted to ‘agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade, and services 
that supplement the economic activities of the state and cooperative sectors’37 
based on paragraph four of the same article. This is a huge obstacle on the path 
to privatization. However, in 2005, The exigency council38 allowed for some 
derogation from this articles by drafting an eight-article Act based on which 
many major industries could be privatized. ‘The general Policies of article 44’ 
                                                 
35 A. Eberhard, “the Independence and Accountability of Africa’s Infrastructure Regulators: 
Reassessing Design and Performance” , 4th AFUR ANNUAL CONFERENCE, 25 Apr 2007, 
Livingston, Zambia. 
36 Paragraph 2, Article 44, Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, ( Constitutional Council of wise 
experts)1979. 
 
37 Paragraph 3, Ibid.. 
38 General Policies of Article 44 of the Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution, Exigency Council May 
22, 2005.  
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as the act is called calls for a minimum 20 percent of privatization on an annual 
basis. However, as mentioned earlier, oil and gas upstream activities remain 
exceptions.  
 
 Based on the third and fourth Development plan Acts39, the state is obliged to 
transfer parts of the electricity sector to the private or public companies. Power 
Ministry privatization committee was formed consisting of 16 official members 
to facilitate privatization in electricity and water. Private investors are called to 
invest in building new power plants via BOT( Build, Operate, Transfer) and 
BOO (Build ,Operate ,Own) contracts. Once an investor is a successful bidder 
the purchase of power is guaranteed through a PPA(Power Purchase 
Agreement). The shares of regional electricity companies have started, only 
very recently, to be transferred to private parties via the stock market and other 
government generators are being sold off to private investors, as well. The 
money raised through these sales is invested by the government for building 
generators in regions unattractive to private investors. 
 
 Pitfalls of reforms and Challenges to Competition 
Monopolies in Upstream oil and gas:  
 
                                                 
39 Fourth Five year economic, cultural and social development plan Act , Iran Islamic 
Parliament, September 1, 2004, Fourth Act. 
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A significant proportion of electricity (90 Percent) is produced from gas or oil 
in Iran. Oil and gas in the upstream remain state monopolies implying that 
generators will all have to buy them from the government at the same price 
which in itself limits the room for competition. Studies show, considering the 
conditions of Iranian electricity sector, the only way the efficiency of private 
generators can be improved compared to state ownership is through keeping 
down labour expenses40. This, however, is not particularly appealing especially 
in a country suffering from two digit unemployment rates41. 
Unattractiveness of investment: 
 
 The electricity sector is a capital intensive sector for private investors and at 
the same time is laden with risks. The government has expressed willingness to 
harbour the risks through power purchase agreements. In developing countries, 
there are potentially very few domestic truly private parties that are prepared to 
make investments on such a scale. Closer inspection of the privatization 
experience of Iran not only in electricity but also in other sectors signify a 
peculiar phenomenon being the involvement of public companies , most 
owned, at least partly, by the state, as prospective investors. The problem is 
worse when these semi-private companies even if not entirely state owned are 
closely related to the government and enjoy significant leverage endangering 
the market and competition. Banks as well as groups related to army are 
examples of such institutions in Today Iranian Economy. 
                                                 
40 Fateh.  Supra note 11 at 7. 
41 Unemployment Rate in Iran is currently 12.5 ( CIA Fact book 2009) and is likely to grow. 
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Another problem discouraging investors is the prospect of earning high interest 
rates if money is deposited in banks reaching a staggering 17% while based on 
realistic calculations, such returns are not likely in the Iranian electricity 
sector42. 
 
As to foreign investment, Iran, despite having made some legislative efforts 
recently43, has not been a successful country in attracting FDI , reasons of 
which transcend the scope of this study. 
Subsidies and non payment: 
 
Electricity in Iran has always been heavily subsidized as a public utility. The 
whole amount of subsidies paid in the electricity sector in the year 2006 was 
57246798 million Rials which equals approximately 5500 dollars; The cost of 
electricity is about five times as much as its price, the difference being paid as 
subsidies by the state. It has been suggested that a private generator is 
economically viable and more efficient than government as long as it is able to 
recover only 31 percent of its running costs from electricity sales44. The 
government will have to pay the discrepancy between the cost and the price to 
                                                 
42 Fateh. Supra note 11 at 7. 
43  Law of Protection and encouragement of Foreign Investors, Iran Islamic Parliament, March 10, 
2002. 
44 Fateh. Supra note 11 at 7.. 
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the consumers as subsidies. This in itself can in the long run decrease the 
incentive of the private sector for efficiency enhancements45. 
 
Another significant predicament is non payment. As discussed before, the 
Iranian economy is dominated by statist policies and state intervention leaving 
most industries in state hands. Most state and public companies do not tend to 
pay the price of their consumed electricity in a timely manner creating a serious 
non-payment of electricity crisis in Iran. In the year 1999 state and public 
sectors had an unpaid debt of 3152891 million Rials46 to the Power industry; 
This figure accounted for almost 24 percent of the electricity sector total gross 
income47. However, as privatization is high on the government’s agenda, this 
problem is expected to be less of an issue in a few years time. 
 
Competition and culture:  
 
For competition to start and continue in a market, there needs to exist the 
infrastructure, culture and necessary regulations. In many developed countries 
there have been competition laws for as long as one hundred years turning 
competition into a familiar and tangible concept. Sherman act in the United 
States, for example, was passed in 1890. What makes competition extremely 
difficult to arise on itself out of privatization and market reform in Iran is that it 
                                                 
45 Fateh. Supra note 11 at 7. 
46 An Equivalent of 331.8 Million dollars. 
47 Supra note 19 at 9. 
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is an alien concept that has never played any part in the country’s economy 
because of the role of the state in the economy. There has never existed a single 
competition law in Iran and the first ever independent committee entrusted with 
the task of drafting one has formed only very recently. Besides, the electricity 
market can not be made completely competitive because of its natural 
monopoly sectors, Distribution and transmission, further complicating it. 
Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect competition in the electricity sector to 
easily result from market reforms to the extent observed in developed countries 
and it, obviously, requires more time and energy in Iran. 
 
Iran did in fact take the initiative to start a regulation committee for electricity, 
but it does not live up to international standards and fails to qualify as an 
independent regulatory committee. Necessary legislative measures should be 
taken immediately to address this problem. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
Iran has obviously started an ambitious program implementing dramatic 
changes to its traditional state-owned monopolistic electricity sector and quite 
expectedly faces many challenges. 
 
However, it has got to a wise start with the right sequencing putting the legal 
and regulatory framework in place before privatizing its restructured electricity 
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sector. This, however, had, more than anything else, to do with its 
constitutional ban on privatization of main industries that is now dissolved. The 
regulatory committee does not satisfy standards of independence intimidating 
private investors. Electricity prices can not be reflective of the level of success 
of the reforms simply because of huge subsidies paid by the government which 
pose a serious challenge which the country is not expected to be able to rise 
above, at least, in close future. There have been problems with investment, as 
well, which permeate the electricity sector and need to be addressed through 
political and macro-economic policy reforms. There should be attempts to 
attract foreign investment in this field which requires extra legislative 
instruments as well as a stable political and legal atmosphere.  
 
All in all, Given the short period of time passed since restructuring and more 
importantly the fact that privatization has just very recently commenced, any 
impartial qualitative judgment will be inexorably immature. 
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